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Why do Healthcare Organizations Choose to Violate Information Technology 
Privacy Regulations? Proposing the Selective Information Privacy Violations in 
Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Privacy concerns about protected healthcare information (PHI) are rampant because of 
the ease of access to PHI from the advent of Healthcare IT (HIT) and its exploding use. 
Continual negative cases in the popular attest to the fact that current privacy regulations are 
failing to keep PHI sufficiently secure in the climate of increate HIT use. To address these 
issues, this paper proposes a theoretical model with testable hypotheses to explain and 
predict organizational IT privacy violations in the healthcare industry. Our model, the 
Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM), 
explains how organizational structures and processes and characteristics of regulatory 
environments alter perceptions of risk and thereby the likelihood of rule violations. Finally, 
based on SIPVHOM, we offer recommendations for the structuring of regulatory 
environments and organizational structures to decrease abuse of PHI. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970’s, privacy laws have become increasingly prevalent in many areas of 
society. Beginning with the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1971, other privacy laws such as the 
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act soon followed. With the advent of the Internet and 
the associated ease of distributing information, laws particular to protect privacy during the 
use of Information Systems (IS) have also emerged. Examples include the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act, and more recently, the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. Our research concerns this latter act (and 
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related acts worldwide), which is an extension of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The US Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 to protect patients’ 
medical information—known as Protected Health Information (PHI)—from discrimination or 
other forms of damaging use. Subtitle D of the HITECH Act extended the enforcement rules 
of HIPAA to provide for stronger enforcement. 
Despite the establishment of these medical privacy laws, data breaches cost the US 
healthcare industry $6 billion each year (Horowitz, 2010). Similarly, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS)—the office in charge of monitoring compliance with 
HIPAA rules—receives nearly ten-thousand complaints about privacy violations each year. 
Not all of these complaints are IT-related and only 20 to 30 percent of the complaints 
require corrective action—with the majority of the remaining complaints being resolved 
before HHS begins an investigation (USDH&HS, 2011b). However, the cost of data 
breaches in the healthcare industry and the number of valid HIPAA complaints show a need 
for improvement in both technical and organizational compliance measures. The need for 
improvement is a particularly pressing problem considering the massive growth in the 
healthcare information technology (HIT) market. 
Although the healthcare industry has been slow to adopt IS technology 
(Bhattacherjee et al., 2007; Connell & Young, 2007), in recent years, HIT has proven 
essential to the industry (Rivard et al., 2011). The 2010 Healthcare Information and 
Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Security Survey suggests that approximately 85 
percent of healthcare organizations in the US now share PHI electronically (HIMSS, 2010). 
Similarly, growth in the adoption of HIT and the associated expenditures is explosive. 
Currently, $80 billion is spent annually in the US on HIT, and the HIT market in the US is 
expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 24 percent during 2012-2014 
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(RNCOS, 2011c). Similar growth is expected in other countries as well, with Russia’s 
compound annual growth rate expected to be 17% during 2010-2014 (RNCOS, 2011b) and 
Australia’s compound annual growth rate expected to be 5.2% during 2010-2012 (RNCOS, 
2011a). With the proliferation of HIT worldwide, it will be ever more important to gain and 
maintain control over IT privacy violations. 
To help control the growing problem of healthcare IT privacy violations, it is 
important to understand the many facets that contribute to the problem. The lens of this 
paper is organizational, as determined by people working in healthcare organization. We 
focus our attention on the selectivity in organizational rule violations—particularly IT privacy 
violations related to healthcare privacy laws such as HIPAA. Organizational rule violations 
are deviations from appropriate conduct, as prescribed by laws and regulations, by 
organizational members working individually or as groups acting in their organizational roles 
to accomplish organizational goals (Vaughan, 1996). As suggested by Selectivity Theory 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), organizations are selective in the rules that they violate. 
That is, different organizations violate different rules, and do so at different times while 
adhering to other rules. Selectivity Theory further suggests that attributes of the 
organization and regulatory environment affect perceptions of risk, and thereby the 
likelihood that a rule will be selected for violation. In this paper, we extend Selectivity Theory 
to explain and predict the selectivity in organizational violations of IT medical privacy laws. 
A review on our phenomenon of interest in recent IS research shows that 
organizational violations—specifically those involving IT privacy regulations—are of 
increasing concern. Worldwide, many countries have implemented legislation similar to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent organizational violations such as financial reporting errors 
(Leon et al., 2010). In terms of organizational privacy violations, many employers keep 
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personal health records of their employees (Burkhard et al., 2010) to share this information 
on a “national health information network” (Ozdemir et al., 2011), which increases potential 
for abuse of IT privacy regulations during information exchange. Personal health records 
are also stored on record systems owned by other agents independent of hospitals and 
clinics to facilitate the flow of records between hospitals, clinics, and other entities in the 
medical industry (Ozdemir et al., 2011). However, clinical staff may be prone to IS 
avoidance and choose not to use these systems (Kane & Labianca, 2011). 
Recent studies show that although training of healthcare staff helps to reduce 
medical errors (Aron et al., 2011); problems still arise pertaining to patient records. 
Nevertheless, Warkentin et al. (2011) show that employee compliance with medical privacy 
laws can be improved through informal learning structures. They suggest that organizational 
support, feedback on privacy compliance, and opportunities to observe compliance 
activities built into informal learning structures can increase employee compliance with 
privacy rules such as HIPAA. Similarly, Johnston and Warkentin (2008) show that 
organizational support affects both an employee’s behavioral intent to comply with medical 
privacy laws and the employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the laws. They also show 
that employees of publicly owned medical institutions are more likely to perceive that the 
organization is supporting compliance efforts and experience self-efficacy to comply. 
Research has also shown how willing, or unwilling, patients are to disclose personal 
information for use in their digital records because of their concern for privacy (Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2011). We address this concern of organizational IT privacy violations. 
This paper adds several important contributions to the literature on medical privacy 
laws, privacy violations, and organizational rule violations in general. Much research has 
been done in terms of individuals violating regulations (e.g., Atwater et al., 2001; D'Arcy et 
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al., 2009; Gerlach et al., 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010). However, organization-level 
studies in this context are rare. This gap in the literature has led to calls for more 
organizational-level and multilevel research in IS security and privacy topics {Belanger, 
2012 #263}. Our goal thus is to start to fill the knowledge gap what causes organizations to 
violate regulations—specifically those relating to IT privacy. Our purpose is to extend 
Selectivity Theory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009) to explain and predict why organizations 
violate IT privacy regulations. 
To address this goal, we proceed as follows. First, we outline Selectivity Theory and 
its several assumptions and constraints. Second, we demonstrate how healthcare 
organizations and HIPAA fit within the assumptions and constraints of Selectivity Theory. 
Third, we outline a theoretical model by adopting Selectivity Theory’s propositions and 
further operationalize each proposition specific to the domain of IT privacy violations in the 
healthcare industry. Finally, we offer a discussion of our theoretical model and propose a 
series of measurement items that could be useful for future model testing.  
REVIEWING FOUNDATIONAL THEORETICAL MODEL: SELECTIVITY THEORY 
In this section, we propose a theoretical model that can explain and predict violations 
of medical privacy laws, particularly IT-related privacy violations. We name our model the 
Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare Organizations Model (SIPVHOM). 
Although we use HIPAA as a proxy for purposes of consistency and clarity, SIPVHOM 
should also hold predictive power in determining compliance with other medical privacy 
laws and explain possible differences in compliance between privacy laws. Further, 
SIPVHOM has the potential to explain and predict differences in compliance between rules 
contained under the same law. Because HIPAA consists of multiple rules, researchers can 
use SIPVHOM to explain why some rules under HIPAA are more likely violated than others. 
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Ultimately, SIPVHOM should inform the creation of privacy laws, and the structuring of the 
associated regulatory environments and organizations that must abide by the laws. 
We based SIPVHOM primarily on Selectivity Theory, proposed by Lehman and 
Ramanujam (2009). Selectivity Theory explains and predicts why organizations selectively 
violate some rules while complying with others. As will be shown in the following pages, 
Selectivity Theory is a natural fit to describe and predict IT privacy violations in the 
healthcare industry.  
OVERVIEW OF SELECTIVITY IN RULE VIOLATIONS 
Selectivity Theory posits that organizations are selective in the rules they violate 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Selectivity Theory suggests that a series of contextual 
conditions and rule characteristics alter the likelihood of an organization selecting a rule for 
violation. When referring to contextual conditions in Selectivity Theory, we mean attributes 
of an organization—such as hierarchical structures or the complexity of business 
processes—that can influence rule violations. Likewise, rule characteristics refer to the 
attributes of a rule or the regulatory environment, such as the phrasing and framing of a rule 
or the power of regulatory agencies that have sway over organizational behaviors. The 
contextual conditions presented in Selectivity Theory include structural secrecy and the 
coupling between prior violations and the associated outcomes—referred to as violation 
coupling. Rule enforceability, procedural emphasis, and rule connectedness are the rule 
characteristics outlined in Selectivity Theory. In Selectivity Theory, the likelihood of a rule 
violation refers to the degree to which systemic factors within the organization and 
regulatory environment will prompt the possibility of a violation of some rule (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009).  
Selectivity Theory further suggests that an organization’s perception of risk and 
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focus of attention mediate the relationship between the contextual conditions and rule 
characteristics, and the likelihood of a rule violation. In Selectivity Theory, perception of risk 
refers to the extent to which a rule violation will be perceived as having negative outcomes 
that appear certain, severe, and uncontrollable (March & Shapira, 1987). Perception of risk 
has a negative relationship with the likelihood an organization will violate a rule. That is, as 
decision makers view a rule violation as riskier, they will be more likely to be deterred by 
fear of negative outcomes and the associated uncontrollability caused by the regulatory 
environment (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
The other mediating variable, focus of attention, is based on the principle which 
suggests “that decision-makers will be selective in the issues and [solutions] they attend to 
at any one time and… that what decision-makers do depends on what issues and 
[solutions] they focus their attention on” (Ocasio, 1997). Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) 
offer little discussion on the focus of attention and its mediating role. Specifically, Selectivity 
Theory uses focus of attention differently for each of the constructs representing the 
contextual conditions and rule characteristics or only by implication. For this reason, we do 
not use focus of attention as a construct in SIPVHOM, as operationalizing focus of attention 
for each construct is outside our scope. Instead, we use focus of attention as a driving 
assumption of the model and bring up its role throughout the paper. The inconsistency in 
the use of focus of attention in Selectivity Theory also creates difficulty in offering a definite 
directional relationship. However, to be consistent with the visual model presented by 
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), we present focus of attention as having a negative 
mediating relationship, as with perception of risk. Figure 1 depicts Selectivity Theory.  




Figure 1. Selectivity Theory, from (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009) 
 
Each of the contextual conditions and rule characteristics in Selectivity Theory alter 
the likelihood of a rule violation. Structural secrecy is one of the contextual conditions that 
affects the likelihood of a rule violation. According to Vaughan (1996), structural secrecy 
refers to “the way that patterns of information, organizational structures, processes, and 
transactions, and the structure of regulatory relations systematically undermine the attempt 
to know and interpret situations in organizations” (p. 647). Secrecy is created as the powers 
for regulating and complying with a rule are concentrated into a single organizational 
subunit (Kim et al., 2004). The concentration and isolation of rule related power into a single 
subunit minimizes potential conflicts related to and detection of a violation (Vaughan, 1996), 
which in turn decreases the perception of risk related to a rule violation. The decrease in the 
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perception of risk thereby increases the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009).  
Violation coupling is another contextual condition in Selectivity Theory. Violation 
coupling describes “the perceived likelihood that… violations will lead to known outcomes—
either positive, such as a performance improvement, or negative, such as regulatory 
penalties” (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight, outcomes of violations 
are well known and predictable, but when they are loose outcomes are unknown and 
unpredictable (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The predictability caused by tight coupling 
allows organizational members to feel a sense of control over potential consequences 
(Shapira, 1997), which sense of control reduces the perception of risk and increases the 
likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
However, when coupling is loose, outcomes of violations are not well known or 
predictable. The ambiguity associated with loose coupling leads organizational members to 
look to past actions to remedy organizational problems (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March, 
1997). If past solutions to a problem have resulted in rule violations, the ambiguity involved 
in loose coupling will leave organizational members unsure of the risk involved—prompting 
them to rely on the rule violating routines they have established previously (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). 
Enforceability is a rule characteristic in Selectivity Theory that affects the likelihood 
of a rule violation. Enforceability is the extent to which organizations view regulatory 
agencies as able and likely to monitor compliance with a rule and seek justice for violations 
(Fuller et al., 2000). When opportunities to monitor an organization are high, organizational 
members perceive the risk of rule violation as high since the chances of detection are high. 
Similarly, the reduced control organizations have over the negative consequences that 
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result from the regulatory intrusions increase the perception of risk and decrease the 
likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Conversely, when opportunities 
to monitor an organization decrease, perceptions of risk decrease because organizations 
can more plausibly deny accusations (Gioia, 1992). 
Procedural emphasis is another rule characteristic in Selectivity Theory. Procedural 
emphasis refers to whether the content of a rule emphasizes procedures over outcomes 
(Lange, 2008). When desired outcomes of a law are perceived as ambiguous, or 
procedural, organizational members seek to create interpretations of a rule, which 
interpretations over time become routine ways of responding to the rule (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). Once interpretations are routinized, organizational members feel a 
sense of predictability and control (March, 1997). This perceived predictability and 
controllability reduce perceptions of risk decrease, and thereby increase the likelihood of 
rule violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
Rule connectedness is another rule characteristic presented in Selectivity Theory. 
Rule connectedness refers to the amount of interdependence or number of functional links 
a rule has with other rules (March et al., 2000). When rules are highly connected, 
coordination costs of violating a rule increase (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Similarly, when 
multiple regulators exist or a rule system is complex, organizational members might feel 
less control over the domain of the rule (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Multiple regulators 
also increases the likelihood of detection and sanctions (March & Shapira, 1987). The 
feeling of uncontrollability and the fear of sanctions increase the perception of risk involved 
in violating a rule and decrease the likelihood that a rule will be violated (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009).  
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF SELECTIVITY THEORY 
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) explain that several key assumptions frame 
Selectivity Theory. We consider these assumptions carefully in adapting Selectivity Theory 
to our context. We categorize the assumptions and constraints into those dealing with rules, 
violations, and organizations. Table 1 summarizes the key assumptions that we leverage. 
The assumptions dealing with the rules themselves limit the direct extension of the model to 
other forms of social guidance or restraint, such as norms or standards. First, Selectivity 
Theory views rules as constraints on organizational members—not as moral principles that 
define social roles. Second, the scope of Selectivity Theory is on external formalized rules, 
such as laws; not on internal rules because they vary from organization to organization.  




Specific Assumption of the Model 
Rules Rules are viewed as constraints on organizational action and not as moral principles (p. 
645) 
Rules must be external and formal, such as laws (p. 644). 
Rules must be low in ambiguity (p. 644). 
Rule violations Rule violations do not include individuals’ violations for personal gain or sabotage (p. 
644). 
Rule violations occur as the result of satisficing solutions, cause by limits to 
organizational attention, that presents themselves during the search for solutions to 
performance downfalls (p. 646). 
Rules violations will focus around critical organizational resources and the interests of 
powerful organizational coalitions (p. 647). 
Perceptions of the risk involved directly influences rule violations (p. 646). 
Organizations Dominant groups determine organizational actions predominantly (p. 646). 
Organizations are governed by an aspiration level (p. 646) 
The theoretical scope focuses only organizations that are vulnerable to committing 
violations, such as those experiencing organizational strain through performance 
downfalls or stiff competition (p. 646). 
 
Third, Selectivity Theory is limited to rules that are reasonably low in ambiguity, 
which means that organizations will have similar interpretations of the rules (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). This does not mean that a rule must be completely clear; Selectivity 
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Theory accounts for some ambiguity in its procedural emphasis construct. 
Moreover, several assumptions describe the organizational factors assumed in 
Selectivity Theory. First, organizational members join organizational coalitions that may 
have differing goals and perceptions of organizational situations and circumstances (March 
& Simon, 1958). The coalition(s) with access to more critical organizational resources have 
greater influence over organizational actions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Second, 
organizational actions are guided by an aspiration level, which is an expected level of future 
performance or achievement (Cyert & March, 1963). Third, when performance falls below 
the aspiration level, organizations become more risk tolerant and are more likely to violate a 
rule as they search for a solution to the performance problem (Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009). This assumption follows the logic of Strain Theory (Merton, 1938), which theory 
suggests that entities that cannot attain culturally desirable goals through legitimate means 
will seek to achieve the goals through deviant behaviors. Selectivity Theory therefore is 
constrained to organizations experiencing strain caused by sources such as performance 
decline, high competition, or heavy regulation.  
The assumptions dealing with violations constrain to which objects Selectivity Theory 
extends and how the likelihood of violations comes about. First, because Selectivity Theory 
is concerned with organizational rule violations, the model does not explain or predict 
individuals’ violations committed for personal gain or sabotage. Some constructs and 
principles clearly apply to individuals committing violation, but explaining the underlying 
phenomena requires an individual-level theory.  
Second, as organizations begin to look for solutions to performance issues, 
organizational attention is limited (March & Simon, 1958), thus limiting the number of 
alternatives they can consider (Ocasio, 2002). Although not all alternatives will lead to rule 
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violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), recent studies show that often these limited 
alternatives do lead to violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). For 
example, Harris and Bromiley (2007) conducted a study of firms that misrepresented 
financial statements from 1997-2002. They compared data of firms that committed financial 
fraud or misrepresentation with data of average performing firms in the same industries at 
during the same period. The results showed firms that misrepresented financial statements 
were more likely to be low performers in comparison to average performers.  
Third, because organizational attention is limited, organizations will mainly focus 
their attention on rules affecting critical resources or interests of powerful organizational 
coalitions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). This occurs because organizations seeking relief 
to performance downfalls frame solutions in terms of regaining and maintaining critical 
resources (Pfeffer, 1992).  
Fourth, solutions to performance downfalls are filtered by the perceived risk of 
implementing each alternative (Shapira, 1997; Slovic, 2000). As solutions are perceived as 
more risky, the likelihood of a rule violation will decrease, and vice versa for solutions that 
are perceived as less risky (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). 
PROPOSING SIPVHOM TO EXPLAIN SELECTIVITY IN RULE VIOLATIONS EXTENDED 
TO A HIPAA IT PRIVACY REGULATION CONTEXT 
As mentioned, in recent years, HIT has become essential in the healthcare industry 
(Rivard et al., 2011) and is now widely used (Feldman & Horan, 2011). Forecasts also 
suggest a boom in the HIT market over the next several years (RNCOS, 2011a; RNCOS, 
2011b; RNCOS, 2011c). To combat privacy violations in all domains, governments 
worldwide have or are beginning to establish laws to protect individuals’ privacy. In the 
United States, a series of laws guards privacy partially. HIPAA and the HITECH Act have 
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taken the role of protecting PHI in the US. In other parts of the world, single laws protect 
PHI and other types of protected information. For example, Canada’s Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) establishes guidelines for protecting the 
electronic distribution of all types of private data, including PHI. The same is true for the 
European Union Directive on Data Privacy (EUDDP) by the European Union. Besides laws, 
international privacy standards like ISO 17799 are being developed to deal with the privacy 
of personal information in information systems (Thomas & Botha, 2007). ISO 17799 is not 
specifically for health records, but the standard covers all personal information, including 
personal health records.  
Organizations can jeopardize the privacy of patients’ PHI in many ways. IT privacy 
violations can occur from basic monitor positioning or not encrypting patient data sent to 
doctors’ cell phones. As illustration, a healthcare organization can fail to keep their some of 
their transaction logs, which is a HIPAA breach. An example of an IT privacy violation is 
demonstrated by the resolution agreement between HHS and UCLA (USDH&HS, 2011d). In 
this case, numerous people accessed medical records over several years (2005-2008) 
without authority or a reason to do so. A contrasting violation is reflected in the resolution 
agreement between HHS and Cignet Health (USDH&HS, 2011d). This was the first civil 
resolution with a monetary penalty (valued at $4.3 million). Cignet Health was fined for 
refusing patient requests to access their own personal medical records. 
Excepting ISO 17799, the mentioned privacy laws fit well into Selectivity Theory’s 
constraints and driving assumptions—allowing our adaptation of Selectivity Theory to 
SIPVHOM. For a review of the key assumptions of Selectivity Theory and SIPVHOM, see 
Table 1. First, HIPAA, PIPEDA, and EUDDP are external formalized laws that govern 
multiple organizations. Second, these laws and directives are relatively stable, limiting 
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unreasonable amounts of ambiguity in the purpose of the laws. Third, a regulatory agency 
governs the laws and directives. For example, HHS regulates HIPAA, and the office of the 
privacy commissioner regulates PIPEDA. The regulatory powers given to these agencies 
help to create a perception of risk, one of the important driving forces in Selectivity Theory 
and SIPVHOM. Fourth, as with most organizations, healthcare organizations worldwide 
have dominant coalitions that guide organizational actions. Finally, frequently healthcare 
organizations worldwide experience organizational strain, from financial difficulties, strains 
of growth, and burdensome regulations. Another potential stressor of healthcare 
organizations that exchange information with other organizations (e.g. PHI data 
warehouses) is incompatible internal IT privacy policies, along with incompatible data 
storage and handling. If the policies do not match well, organizations may find it is too costly 
to fully comply with the corresponding group, leaving violations as an opportunity cost 
(Feldman & Horan, 2011). 
In proposing SIPVHOM, we use HIPAA as a proxy for other healthcare privacy laws, 
though some adaptation may be necessary to account for cultural factors when studying 
related laws in other countries. HIPAA gives the United States Office for Civil Rights the 
authority and guidelines to protect a person’s PHI (USDH&HS, 2011e). HIPAA is monitored 
and regulated by HHS, and provides federal US protections for PHI held by covered 
entities, giving patients an array of rights with respect to that information (USDH&HS, 2007). 
Section D of the HITECH Act extends HIPAA rules, particularly those related to HIT. The 
HITECH Act has guidelines for safeguarding electronic storage and transmission of PHI and 
gives HHS power to issue heavy fines for violation of any of HIPAA’s rules.  
HIPAA is a useful surrogate for other privacy laws because it is standardized, 
formalized, used by a large population (Warkentin et al., 2011), and is quite expansive in its 
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coverage. HIPAA consists of privacy rules, security rules, breach notification rules, and 
enforcement rules. The privacy rules outline appropriate uses and disclosures of PHI. The 
security rules establish appropriate administrative, physical, and technical measures to 
ensure the security of electronic PHI. The breach notification rules, an extension of HIPAA 
established by the HITECH Act, require healthcare organizations to provide timely 
notification of electronic breaches of unsecured PHI. The enforcement rules, also extended 
by the HITECH ACT, further establish provisions for conducting investigations of HIPAA 
violations and imposing fines. Importantly, HIPAA is also particular to healthcare, making it 
easier to isolate IT privacy violations by healthcare organizations. 
EXTENDING PROPOSITIONS TO A HIPAA IT CONTEXT 
SIPVHOM adopts the propositions proposed by Lehman & Ramanujam (2009) in 
Selectivity Theory, excepting the propositions which refer to focus of attention, to explain 
and predict IT privacy rule violations committed by healthcare organizations. SIPVHOM 
uses focus of attention as a driving axiom, but not as a construct. Beyond adopting 
Selectivity Theory’s propositions to a healthcare context, we further operationalize the 
propositions into a series of testable hypotheses. Appendix A provides several possible 
measures that might be useful in testing the hypotheses. We begin unfolding SIPVHOM by 
examining perceived risk as a predictor of the likelihood of IT privacy rule violations and 
offer testable hypotheses. We then discuss the contextual conditions and rule 
characteristics in SIPVHOM that affect the perceived risk of violating IT privacy rules. Figure 
2 depicts SIPVHOM and its hypotheses. 
Proposition 1: An increased perception of risk decreases the likelihood that a privacy 
rule will be selected for violation 
An increase in the perceived risk associated with a rule violation will decrease the  




Figure 2. Selective Information Privacy Violations in Healthcare 
Organizations Model (SIPVHOM) 
 
likelihood that the rule will be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Perceptions of risk 
“will vary across organizations, depending on their histories, structures, and cultures” 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). As organizations’ members search for solutions to 
organizational strain, alternatives will be selected based on their perceived risk (Shapira, 
1997; Slovic, 2000). Alternatives that involve a rule violation will be perceived as riskier to 
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the extent that negative outcomes appear more certain, severe, and uncontrollable (March 
& Shapira, 1987). The more that a negative outcome is potentially threatening to the 
organization's legitimacy, the more risky it will seem (Zucker, 1977). As decision makers 
perceive an alternative resulting in a rule violation as riskier, they will be less likely to select 
the alternative and violate the rule (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
To operationalize perceptions of risk and the likelihood of rule violations, we 
leverage research by Dinev & Hart (2006) and D’Arcy et al. (2009). Although most of the 
conceptualizations of risk in IS literature have focused on economic loss (Jarvenpaa et al., 
2000; Pavlou, 2003; Pavlou & Geffen, 2004), Dinev and Hart (2006) show that risk can be 
conceptualized in other ways that may be more salient to situational factors. For example, 
they focus their study on privacy risk (the perceived uncertainty related to disclosing 
personal information) relative to individuals’ e-commerce purchasing behaviors. Importantly, 
for e-commerce purchasing behavior, conceptualizing risk as privacy risk “might be… more 
influential… than economic risk in dissuading individuals from conducting e-commerce 
transactions” (Dinev & Hart, 2006). Although this paper is not interested in privacy risk, nor 
e-commerce, the flexibility in selecting non-economic risk factors that are salient to 
healthcare organizations makes Dinev and Hart’s (2006) conceptualization of risk useful to 
the economically neutral description of risk proposed in SIPVHOM. 
Dinev and Hart’s (2006) conceptualization of risk is also compelling because it links 
risk to behavioral intention. We suggest that the behavioral intention to violate a HIPAA rule 
is an appropriate operationalization for the likelihood of a HIPAA rule violation. The logical 
jump from the behavioral intention to violate a rule to the likelihood of a rule violation is not a 
big leap, because behavioral intention is often measured on a continuum (e.g., weak 
intention to strong intention) (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). This is 
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the essence of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1988). Thus, as intentions to violate weaken so 
does the likelihood of a rule violation. Importantly, behavioral intention has been widely 
used as a construct in IS research and—important to our study—in IS security research. For 
example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) use behavioral intention to account for individual’s misuse of 
an organization’s IS, such as privacy breaches or property damage. Like their study, we are 
interested in the misuse of privacy, but unlike their study, we are only interested in privacy 
violations. Since our study ultimately focuses on IT privacy rule violations, we make use of 
D’Arcy et al. (2009) IS misuse intention as a representation of the likelihood of a rule 
violation. 
Similar to Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), Dinev and Hart (2006) suggest that 
perceptions of risk result from fear and uncertainty about negative consequences of actions. 
They further posit that concern about the perceived risk—an internalization of the potential 
negative consequences associated with an action—will lead to further uncertainty and 
thereby strengthen the effect of risk on behavioral intention. Lastly, they suggest that people 
will try to avoid perceived negative consequences. The desire to avoid negative 
consequences is consistent with expectancy theory (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 
1964), which predicts that individuals act in ways that will minimize negative outcomes and 
maximize positive outcomes. Following this logic, decision makers in charge of HIPAA 
compliance will avoid alternatives to performance downfalls that result in a HIPAA rule 
violation to the extent that the consequences of violating the rule are perceived negatively. 
In summary, 
H1: An increase in the perceived risk of violating a HIPAA rule will decrease the 
intention of violating the rule. 
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Proposition 2: Structural secrecy decreases perception of risk 
Structural secrecy is a contextual condition that affects the likelihood of a privacy-
rule violation. An increase in structural secrecy decreases the perception of risk and 
subsequently increases the likelihood that a rule will be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009). High secrecy occurs when roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying 
with a rule are concentrated into a single subunit (Kim et al., 2004). This concentration of 
rule-related power into a single subunit can occur with the division of labor, organizational 
hierarchy, and job specialization that isolate knowledge of rule-related tasks (Vaughan, 
1996). Furthermore, secrecy increases when the activities of the subunit are dissociated 
from other subunits (March & Simon, 1958). Informal relationships between members of 
subunits have been shown to have more influence on communication structures than formal 
relationships (Ghoshal et al., 1994). The increase in secrecy caused by the dissociation of 
subunits therefore could increase if the members of the subunit in charge of rule compliance 
are removed from informal networking structures as well as from formal structures. When 
secrecy is high, the isolation of rule-related power and knowledge helps to minimize 
potential conflicts related to and detection of a violation (Vaughan, 1996), which decreases 
the perception of risk related to a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Sharing the 
roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying with a rule amongst organizational 
subunits can help to reduce secrecy (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
Management or other dominant coalitions can foster structural secrecy to guard 
managerial interests and to protect critical resources that are vulnerable to external rules 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In the practice of medicine, some of the most important 
organizational values and interests of dominant coalitions (e.g., doctors, nurses, hospital 
administrators) include the quality and efficiency of the care provided to patients (Grol, 
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2001; Schade et al., 2006; Teasdale, 2008), and a strong valuation of autonomy and status 
by physicians and other healthcare professionals (Rivard et al., 2011). Where HIPAA 
infringes on the quality or efficiency of care, or the autonomy or status of healthcare 
professionals, secrecy is likely to be high. HIPAA mandates that organizations must 
establish a system for monitoring and complying with HIPAA rules, but offers flexibility in the 
design of the regulatory system (USDH&HS, 2011d). Similarly, HHS does not actively 
monitor compliance (Administration, 2011). Together, these factors make designing an 
organizational regulatory system high in secrecy less detectable and more feasible for 
organizations governed by HIPAA. 
In general, the healthcare industry—especially hospitals and clinics—are likely to be 
high in structural secrecy. Again, physicians value and seek for a high degree of autonomy 
in their work. In essence, a physician’s autonomy is parallel to isolating power into a single 
subunit. The extent to which physicians are granted full autonomy to make decisions 
regarding their patients and patient data fosters structural secrecy. The “clan” mentality 
shared by physicians also fosters secrecy. That is, physicians tend to rely heavily on the 
opinions of other physicians while ignoring opinions of external groups (Agarwal et al., 
2007). Because physicians tend to ignore external influence, the “clan” mentality is parallel 
to being removed from informal communication structures, which further increases secrecy. 
Similarly, private-sector medical organizations are more likely to hoard 
organizational resources than public sector organizations—leading to an increase in 
structural secrecy in private sector organizations. This notion receives support from the 
findings of Johnston and Warkentin (2008). They show that employees of public sector 
medical organizations are more likely to feel efficacy and support in their privacy 
compliance efforts than employees in private-sector medical organizations. This could be 
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the case if public-sector medical organizations receive more resources (and oversight) to 
comply with rules like HIPAA. If true, private-sector medical organizations, would be more 
likely to engage in activities to protect critical organizational resources, and may therefore, 
intentionally create structural secrecy.  
Organizations in the healthcare industry can reduce structural secrecy in several 
ways. For example, hospitals can establish inter-unit teams of administrators, doctors, and 
nurses dedicated to interpreting and monitoring HIPAA regulations. To take advantage of 
the “clan” mentality of physicians, hospital or clinic administrators might also seek to gain 
approval of highly regarded physicians, allowing these physicians to influence other 
physicians. Similarly, Nicholson and Smith (2007) looked at the impact of HIPAA and other 
policies that protect personal health information. They found that government policies such 
as HIPAA merely highlight the deficiencies inherent in medical record privacy systems. 
They suggest that the best approach to compliance is to emphasize education about the 
key issues within HIPAA: confidentiality and sensitivity. Organization-wide HIPAA training 
would likely reduce secrecy by creating a sense that HIPAA-related violations can be easily 
exposed to the entire organization. 
Because no valid measure currently exists for structural secrecy, to operationalize 
the relationship between structural secrecy and perception of risk, we focus on 
operationalizations of communication structures. Communication structures have been 
shown to affect intra-organizational knowledge sharing (Tsai, 2002). Communication 
structures refer to the formal and informal structures that direct and regulate communication 
within an organization (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002). Formal communication structures 
are those created by organizational hierarchy. Formal structures consist of centralization, 
formalization, and specialization (Miller & Droge, 1986; Van de Ven, 1976). Centralization, 
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for example, is an important element in organizational structure and has been shown to be 
a parsimonious representation of formal structure (Ghoshal et al., 1994). According to Tsai 
(2002), centralization can create inefficiencies in the transfer of knowledge, and can also 
create an inactive role for subunits that do not hold decision-making authority. This inactive 
role may “reduce the initiatives that a [subunit] takes in” exchanging information with other 
subunits (Tsai, 2002, p. 181). These findings about centralization are consistent with the 
findings of (Kim et al., 2004) on secrecy. By obscuring information, centralization acts to 
create secrecy, and as predicted by Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), this will decrease 
perceptions of detection and the risk involved in violating a rule. Accordingly, healthcare 
organizations that centralize the power of monitoring and complying with HIPAA regulations 
will likely experience increased secrecy and decreased perceptions of risk. In summary, 
H2: An increase in the centralization of power related to HIPAA compliance will 
decrease the perceived risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation. 
Informal communication structures have also been shown to affect the transfer of 
knowledge (Tsai, 2002). In fact, informal structures can have more influence on 
communication than formal structures (Ghoshal et al., 1994). Informal communication 
structures are relationships that develop laterally or horizontally, rather than vertically as 
occurs in organizations with high centralization. Unlike centralization, informal relationships 
help to improve the exchange of information between organizational subunits (Homans, 
1950), and can even give subunits access to other subunits and their resources (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1986). This exchange and access facilitates knowledge sharing (Tsai, 2002) 
and therefore decreases the likelihood of high structural secrecy. Hence, healthcare 
organizations that encourage lateral communication through informal relations with 
members of other subunits will experience an increase in knowledge sharing, thereby 
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decreasing the chance of structural secrecy. In summary,   
H3: An increase in informal networking opportunities between a subunit in charge of 
HIPAA compliance and other subunits will increase the perceived risk associated 
with a HIPAA rule violation. 
Proposition 3: Violation coupling affects perception of risk 
Violation coupling is another contextual condition that affects the violation likelihood 
of a privacy rule. When organizational members detect a tightly coupled connection 
between prior rule violations and the associated outcomes, perceptions of risk increase 
when the outcome is negative and decrease when the outcome is positive (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight, organizational members perceive the outcome 
of a violation as predictable. Whereas, when coupling is loose, outcomes of a violation are 
ambiguous and not easily predicted (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight 
and prior outcomes are positive, organizational members feel a sense of control over 
potential consequences (Shapira, 1997). Violations tightly coupled to positive outcomes, 
therefore, are less likely to be perceived as risky and are more likely to be repeated 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). However, when violations are tightly coupled to negative 
outcomes, the perception of risk increases (Holland, 1975) and the rule is less likely to be 
selected for violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). 
Due to the complexity of organizations, however, loose coupling is far more 
prevalent than tight coupling (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Some of the reasons for the 
pervasiveness of loose coupling include dissociation between the violators of a rule and 
those who experience the outcomes; the occurrence of violations and outcomes at different 
points in time; one violation leading to multiple outcomes; one outcome stemming from 
multiple causes; and a lack of organizational memory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).  
This situation may be particularly true with regard to HIPAA rules. First, the 
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healthcare industry is very complex. The industry is highly fragmented with multiple players 
(Bentley et al., 2008). Second, HIPAA regulations allow organizations to outsource their 
data storage and other HIPAA regulated tasks (USDH&HS, 2003). By outsourcing, 
violations made by the outsourcer could be dissociated from the outcomes experienced by 
the organization or create a lack of organizational memory. Lastly, HHS does not monitor 
compliance of HIPAA, but asks that victims report abuses (Administration, 2011). If a delay 
occurs between a HIPAA privacy violation and the time that a patient reports the abuse or 
HHS commences an investigation, loose coupling is possible. 
When an organization cannot detect a tightly coupled connection between prior rule 
violations and the associated outcomes, perceptions of risk decrease (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). The ambiguity resulting from loose coupling drives an organization to 
identify agreeable interpretations of an outcome, which interpretations are not necessarily 
correct (Weick, 1995). Organizations often fulfill this need by looking to past actions and rely 
on previous alternatives to remedy problems (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March, 1997). 
Similarly, to validate prior decisions, organizational members may construe outcomes in a 
self-justifying manner (March, 1997). If an organization has previously violated a rule, due to 
the ambiguity caused by loose coupling and the ease of relying on past alternatives, the risk 
of violating the rule again may not be easily discernible (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). 
Healthcare organizations may be more likely to experience loose coupling. For example, 
HIPAA has a self-reporting and patient-reporting mechanism (Administration, 2011), and if 
neither is activated, then a violation may never be detected and lead to bad habits or policy 
work around. 
To operationalize violation coupling, we focus on one of the conditions that creates 
loose coupling—lack of organizational memory. Organizational memory refers to the 
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“collective beliefs, behavioral routines, or physical artifacts that vary in their content, level, 
dispersion, and accessibility” (Moorman & Miner, 1997). As suggested in this definition, 
multiple forms of organizational memory exist, including beliefs, behavioral routines and 
procedures, and physical artifacts such as organizational structure. In healthcare 
organizations, organizational memory might manifest itself through beliefs and values such 
as quality of care. Concerning IT privacy violations, organizational memory might manifest 
itself in policies and procedures on using computer systems to minimize HIPAA violations. 
As suggested above, perceptions of risk decrease as the organizational memory on 
violation outcomes diminishes. Since violations are primarily actions, we focus our study of 
organization memory primarily on behavioral routines and procedures rather than on beliefs 
and values or physical artifacts. 
Organizational memory can affect violation coupling in several ways. First, the 
dispersion of organizational memory may not be widely accepted (Moorman & Miner, 1997). 
Certain organizational subcultures, for example, might be slow to adopt organizational 
memory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Deshpande & Frederick E. Webster, 1989; Martin & Siehl, 
1983; Smircich, 1983). In hospitals, three main groups exist with separate values—nurses, 
doctors, and administrators (Rivard et al., 2011). Each group has different views on the 
organization and on violations of HIPAA. In general, administrators feel the greatest need to 
comply with HIPAA rules, whereas doctors and nurses may see the rules as hindrances to 
the quality or efficiency of providing care to patients. Similarly, administrators feel a greater 
self-efficacy to comply than do medical staff (Johnston & Warkentin, 2008).  
Nurses and doctors thus might have less organizational memory of HIPAA 
compliance procedures and are more likely to violate them. This may be particularly true for 
physicians if the “clan” mentality held amongst physicians is opposed to HIPAA or HITECH 
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Act regulations. Venkatesh et al. (2011) show that a physician’s professional network has a 
negative effect on the use of e-healthcare systems. Physicians, therefore, may be opposed 
to the goals of the HITECH Act. However, if the “clan” mentality is leveraged to promote 
compliance with privacy laws, HIPAA- and HITECH-related organizational memory may 
improve. When organizational memory of HIPAA related procedures and outcomes are 
widely dispersed, the salience of HIPAA violations and the associated outcomes are likely 
to rise. This is turn will create the outcome-based risk perceptions predicted by Lehman and 
Ramanujam (2009). In summary, 
H4a: When the dispersion of organizational memory of HIPAA related information is 
low, prior HIPAA violations will decrease the perception of risk despite the prior 
outcomes associated with a HIPAA rule violation. 
H4b: When the dispersion of organizational memory is high, prior HIPAA violations 
with positive outcomes will decrease the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA 
rule violation. 
H4c: When the dispersion of organizational memory is high, prior HIPAA violations 
with negative outcomes will increase the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA 
rule violation. 
Third, the accessibility to organizational memory may be restricted (Moorman & 
Miner, 1997). Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) suggest that organizations may seek to 
increase structural secrecy by isolating information about monitoring of and compliance with 
a rule in order to create opportunities for violation. They explain that this may be particularly 
true for rules that inhibit the pursuit or maintenance of critical organizational resources 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Similarly, they suggest that organizational structures can 
create secrecy by isolating compliance and monitoring responsibilities into a single 
organizational subunit. Ultimately, structural secrecy minimizes the amount of organizational 
knowledge about a given subject distributed to other parts of the organization. When 
organizations isolate information—on purpose or unintentionally through the design of 
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organizational structures—the accessibility to organizational memory is likely to decrease. 
In summary, 
H5a: When structural secrecy is high, prior HIPAA violations will decrease the 
perception of risk despite the prior outcomes associated with a HIPAA rule violation. 
H5b: When structural secrecy is low, prior HIPAA violations with positive outcomes 
will decrease the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation. 
H5c: When structural secrecy is low, prior HIPAA violations with negative outcomes 
will increase the perception of risk associated with a HIPAA rule violation. 
Proposition 4: Enforceability increases perception of risk 
The enforceability of a privacy rule is a rule characteristic that affects the likelihood 
of rule violation. An increase in the enforceability of a rule increases the perception of risk, 
making a rule less likely to be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Enforceability is high 
when regulatory agencies are able to frequently monitor the actions of an organization, 
which is most likely to occur when the regulatory agency and the organization are highly 
interdependent (Edelman, 1992). Enforceability also increases when the social 
consequences for seeking justice for violations are low (Fuller et al., 2000). This is likely to 
occur when a regulatory agency “exert[s] strong influence on [an] organization” (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). However, to avoid alienating powerful constituencies, regulatory 
agencies do not always exert their full influence (Edelman & Suchman, 1997). When 
chances to monitor an organization are high, enforceability increases the perceived risk of 
violating a rule by increasing the chances of detection and reducing the control 
organizations have over the negative consequences that can result from a rule violation 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In contrast, when chances to monitor an organization 
decrease, perceptions of risk decrease because organizations are better able to deny 
accusations plausibly (Gioia, 1992) and increase control by creating symbolic compliance 
(Edelman, 1992).  
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To operationalize enforceability, we rely on deterrence theory. Deterrence theory 
comes from criminology research, but IS security research has also recently applied this 
theory to information security policy compliance research (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Qing et 
al., 2011; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Deterrence theory states that perceptions of sanctions 
designed to punish violators deters individuals from deviant behavior. Research has looked 
at multiple characteristics of sanctions in inducing deterrence, including the severity of 
sanctions, the certainty of sanctions, and the celerity of sanctions. Severity of sanctions 
refers to “the perceived degree of punishment for [an] intended act” (Qing et al., 2011, p. 
57). Certainty of sanctions refers to “the perceived probability of being punished for [an] 
intended act” (Qing et al., 2011, p. 57). Celerity of sanctions refers to “the perceived 
swiftness of being punished for [an] intended act (Qing et al., 2011, p. 57). Much debate 
exists about the strength and importance of each of these characteristics, and some 
contradictory findings exist with regard to deterrence theory in general. For example, D’Arcy 
et al. (2009) found evidence that severity of sanctions is more effective in deterring deviant 
behavior than the certainty of sanctions, whereas Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) did not. Qing 
et al. (2011) also found no evidence of deterrence effects. We do not take issue with these 
findings, but instead rely on the theoretical basis of deterrence theory to explain how 
sanctions might affect risk perceptions in decision makers. 
The certainty of sanctions and the severity of sanctions create a sense of fear, which 
acts to deter IS violations (D'Arcy et al., 2009). Both enforceability as proposed in Selectivity 
Theory and the certainty and severity of sanctions, as proposed in deterrence theory, 
suggest that fear of negative outcomes reduces the likelihood of deviant behaviors. Again, 
the desire to avoid negative consequences is consistent with expectancy theory (Van Eerde 
& Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964).  
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Currently, HIPAA does not directly monitor organizational actions, but relies instead 
on victims to report violations (Administration, 2011). According to Miller and Sarat (1981), 
when victims are left to report abuses, laws are more likely to be abused than when the 
rules are monitored by third-party agencies. Additionally, few documented cases of 
regulatory sanctions for HIPAA violations exist. In fact, as of 2008, the HHS reported that it 
had received over 33,000 complaints pertaining to privacy violations but no fines had been 
levied (Insider, 2008). The lack of previous negative outcomes makes HIPAA penalties 
appear to be unlikely and uncertain. In summary, 
H6: An increase in the certainty of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase 
the perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation. 
However, despite the uncertainty of sanctions related to HIPAA violations, some 
financial settlements exist, including a $2.25 million settlement by CVS for not disposing of 
records correctly and a $1 million settlement made by RiteAid for improperly disposing of pill 
bottles and labels (USDH&HS, 2011a; USDH&HS, 2011e). Similarly, with the advent of the 
HITECH Act, stiff penalties are increasingly common—such as a $1 million fine assessed to 
Massachusetts General Hospital and a $4.3 million fine to Cignet Healthcare. For these 
organizations, repeat offenses would be less likely due to an increase in the perceived risk 
created by severe fines and settlements. In summary, 
H7: An increase in the severity of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase 
the perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation. 
Lastly, the celerity of sanctions decreases deviance. However, celerity has been 
shown to be the weakest characteristic of sanctions (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Pavlovian 
conditioning is the basis of celerity—particularly the conditioning of responses by timely 
negative reinforcement. This conditioning was predicted for animals, and humans “possess 
a far greater cognitive capacity than do animals for connecting acts with temporally remote 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/11-138
31 
 
consequences” (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, p. 867). Nonetheless, to be consistent with 
deterrence theory in its entirety we present celerity in the model. In comparison to other 
government sanctions, HIPAA sanctions may be particularly slow to occur. As suggested 
above, HIPAA violations are self-reported and any delay in a patient reporting violations will 
decrease celerity. Similarly, many reported abuses are resolved before HHS can even find 
the time to start an investigation. Given this information, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H8: An increase in the celerity of sanctions for a HIPAA rule violation will increase the 
perceived risk associated with the HIPAA rule violation. 
Proposition 5: Procedural emphasis decreases perception of risk 
Procedural emphasis is another rule characteristic that affects the likelihood of a 
privacy rule violation. An increase in procedural emphasis decreases the perception of risk, 
and subsequently increases the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). 
When procedural emphasis is high, the desired outcomes of a rule are ambiguous. 
Whereas, when it is low, a rule is unambiguous and desired outcomes are clearly defined 
(Edelman, 1992). According to Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), organizational 
interpretations of a rule in situations where procedural emphasis is high can lead to a 
routinized interpretation of the rule that holds true even in unambiguous situations. This 
occurs through the managerialization of law “wherein legal ideas are refigured by 
managerial ways of thinking as they flow across the boundaries of legal fields and into 
managerial and organizational fields” (Edelman et al., 2001, p. 1589). Interpretations of 
rules tend to be guided by the pursuit of critical, organizational resources (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). Power struggles about the interpretations of a rule create emerging 
meaning (Pfeffer, 1992). The meaning is legitimized by powerful organizational members to 
favor their particular interpretations (Johnson et al., 2006), which interpretations become 
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stabilized methods for maintaining and acquiring critical resources (Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009). As interpretations of rules stabilize and become routinized, organizational members 
view them as predictable and controllable (March, 1997). The routinized interpretations 
cause perceptions of risk to decrease, even in unambiguous situations (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009).  
In the healthcare industry, one power struggle for interpreting HIPAA rules manifests 
as a struggle between administrators and physicians over the degree of physician 
autonomy in complying with HIPAA. Due to the physician “clan” mentality, physicians are 
likely to interpret HIPAA rules in a self-interested manner that minimizes encroachments on 
physician autonomy and maximizes the efficiency and quality of care they can provide to 
patients. 
We propose goal clarity as a useful surrogate to procedural emphasis. Goal clarity 
refers to the extent to which a goal designates a clear course of action and provides 
information about how to achieve the goal (Tziner et al., 1993). When the goal clarity of a 
rule is high, the rule’s expected outcomes are defined clearly. As predicted by Lehman and 
Ramanujam (2009), when outcomes are clearly defined ambiguity will be low—making 
plausible deniability less likely and perceived risk high. Currently, many of HIPAA’s rules are 
flexible and allow for interpretations, calling for “reasonable” actions (USDH&HS, 2008). 
Similarly, the interpretations of HIPAA rules are continually evolving (Wipke-Tevis & Pickett, 
2008). These circumstances make certain HIPAA rules lower in goal clarity and higher in 
procedural emphasis—increasing violation likelihood. In summary, 
H9: An increase in the goal clarity of a HIPAA rule will decrease the perception of risk 
associated with the rule. 
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Proposition 6: Rule connectedness increases perception of risk 
Rule connectedness is another rule characteristic that affects the likelihood of a 
privacy rule violation. An increase in rule connectedness will increase perceptions of risk 
and thereby decrease the likelihood of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). 
When connectedness is high, a rule has many interdependent rules. Whereas, when 
connectedness is low, a rule has no interdependent rules, or only a few (Lehman & 
Ramanujam, 2009). Connectedness increases perceived risk in two ways. First, 
coordination costs increase when rules are highly connected (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). 
Second, when multiple regulators exist or the rule system is complex, organizational 
members may feel less control (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), which increases the 
likelihood of detection and sanctions (March & Shapira, 1987). The increase in coordination 
costs and likelihood of detection increase the perception of risk involved in violating a rule.  
Several factors can establish high rule connectedness. First, complex work may 
require more interdependencies between rules to help govern the complexity (Scott, 2002). 
Similarly, multiple governing bodies may issue interdependent rules in a complex 
environment where each agency participates in regulation (Landau, 1969). Additionally, 
large-scale crises may induce the creation of interdependent rules (Collins et al., 2005; 
March et al., 2000). Rule connectedness can also increase purposefully when rules or 
governing agencies are strategically created to ensure conformity (Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009).  
Furthermore, we argue that in an IT context, the advent of new technology can lead 
to the creation of new rules. For example, the ubiquity of HIT in the healthcare industry 
prompted legislators to create the HITECH Act. The act was created to encourage the 
meaningful use and adoption of HIT (USDH&HS, 2011c). Subtitle D of the HITECH Act 
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micromanages the details surrounding the electronic transmission of PHI and now adds civil 
and criminal penalties for violations (USDH&HS, 2011c). The introduction of HITECH Act 
will likely reduce the likelihood of future HIPAA violations relative to the growth of HIT.  
Lastly, we argue that global connections between physicians may increase rule 
connectedness. For example, European nations are attributed with being more concerned 
with patient privacy than nations like the US. To the extent that highly respected physicians 
in Europe with pro-privacy ideals associate with physicians in other parts of the world, the 
influence of European privacy ideals may spread to other parts of the world, thereby 
increasing perceptions of rule connectedness. 
To operationalize rule connectedness we rely on Sullivan’s (2010) measure of rule 
density. Like Lehman and Ramanujam (2009), Sullivan (2010) shows how organizational 
attention can affect rules. Selectivity Theory uses organizational attention to describe how 
rules that are highly connected draw attention. Conversely, Sullivan (2010) uses 
organizational attention to describe how regulating bodies focus attention on certain 
problems to create new rules in a rule domain. In essence, both authors are investigating 
the number of related rules. Therefore, rule density serves as an excellent measure for rule 
connectedness. In summary, 
H10: An increase in the rule density of a HIPAA rule will increase the perceived risk of 
violating the rule. 
DISCUSSION 
Given the many problems that healthcare institutions face in regard to compliance 
with IT medical privacy laws, this paper proposed SIPVHOM (see Figure 2), which is a 
model developed to explain and predict violations of IT privacy rules. In particular, we use 
HIPAA as a proxy for IT privacy violations. IT privacy violations are of particular importance 
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because of the ubiquity of the electronic transfer and display of protected medical 
information (HIMSS, 2010). Although we selected HIPAA as a surrogate privacy law to 
create a seamless story for SIPVHOM, the model can also help to predict organizational 
compliance with similar privacy laws—such as PIPEDA in Canada or EUDDP.  
SIPVHOM is based primarily on Selectivity Theory (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), a 
model proposed to predict selectivity in organizational rule violations. Like Selectivity 
Theory, SIPVHOM suggests that a series of contextual conditions and rule characteristics 
affect the perception of risk involved in violating a rule, and thereby, the likelihood that a rule 
will be selected for violation. We offer testable hypotheses of the propositions of Selectivity 
Theory contextualized to HIPPA. With the recent adoption of the HITECH Act in the US and 
its role in allowing the first significant fines for HIPAA violations starting in 2011, we offer a 
timely investigation of the topic of medical privacy laws. In the future, SIPVHOM can help 
explain the likely changes in compliance due to the advent of the HITECH Act. Ultimately, 
we believe SIPVHOM can help to inform the creation and reform of privacy laws and the 
structuring of the regulatory environments that govern them and the organizations that must 
follow them. 
Although the focus of this paper has been on healthcare organizations, researchers 
can likely extend SIPVHOM to other related domains. As illustration, credit card fraud is a 
colossal issue for consumers, credit-card companies, and credit-card issuing banks. Few 
formalized, external rules exist to mandate how organizations should deal with the 
electronic transfer of credit card data; however, a sort of private ordering has emerged in 
the credit card industry. The industry has created a form of external control through the 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Although not a traditional law, 
PCI DSS contains many of the same qualities of a formalized law that make Selectivity 
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Theory and SIPVHOM ideal models to explain and predict violations of PCI DSS. The listed 
core assumptions of SIPVHOM are the primarily constraints that researchers should 
consider for such an extension. Nonetheless, further theoretical development could 
neutralize many of the limiting assumptions. For example, researchers could likely apply 
many of the concepts of SIPVHOM to an individual context by substituting organizational 
theories with individual-level psychological theories. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The primary limitation of SIPVHOM is that it has not been empirically tested (neither 
has Selectivity Theory). To help facilitate the future testing of SIPVHOM, we thus briefly 
address ways researchers might operationalize and test its constructs. In doing so, it is 
important to note that multiple measures exist for some of the constructs; thus, using 
discretion is pivotal in selecting the most appropriate and representative measures to 
maximize construct validity. Some of the constructs also do not have closely associated 
measures from the literature, which makes opertionalization more challenging. For these 
constructs, we suggest possible measurement surrogates. Appendix A summarizes these 
possibilities. 
In terms of testing, preliminary studies could test the hypotheses through scenarios-
based approach where working professionals receive hypothetical vignettes to test the 
underlying theory. This approach has several advantages when dealing with topics with 
which participants do not want to disclose their individual involvement in and knowledge of 
the organization’s violations, and has been effectively used in IS compliance research (e.g., 
Hu et al., 2011; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Testing can then evolve to more challenging field 
studies of actual organizations that are required to follow HIPAA. More complex testing 
could also potentially use large samples of randomly selected organizations and randomly 
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selected individuals within these organizations. Finally, organizations from different cultures 
and with different HIPAA-like regulations would be useful to study. A study of SIPVHOM 
focused on organizational culture could also be useful because the interplay between 
doctors, nurses, and administrators has been shown to be important in daily hospital life 
(Rivard et al., 2011). 
Another limitation of SIPVHOM includes the lack of predictive and explanative power 
with regard to organizations performing at or above their aspiration levels, and internal rules 
and regulations. Again, part of SIPVHOM’s foundation is Merton’s Strain Theory (1938), 
which is leveraged to suggest that organizations that cannot obtain socially desirable goals 
through legitimate means might seek to fulfill their goals through deviant behavior. This 
theoretical foundation limits the predictive power of our model to those organizations that 
cannot attain their aspiration level. SIPVHOM is also restricted to predicting external 
formalized rules, and does not extend to social norms related to privacy, or internal 
regulations of organizations. Because social norms are unregulated in the same manner as 
formalized rules, they do not fit SIPVHOM well, and the nuances in the differences between 
internal rules and regulations would likely pose a problem in showing selectivity of rule 
violations at an organizational level.  
Similarly, Selectivity Theory suggests that organizational attention is an important 
mediating construct in explaining violations, but the evidence and discussion of focus of 
attention is scant in Lehman and Ramanujam’s (2009) article. For this reason, SIPVHOM 
does not apply focus of attention as a construct, but instead uses the concept as an axiom 
to describe certain aspects of the model. Future research can revisit and further build the 
link to organizational attention. 
Finally, it could be beneficial to study SIPVHOM in the context of multiple privacy 
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laws. For example, HIPAA, PIPEDA, or EUDDP could be examined together to determine if 
the rule characteristics or contextual conditions related to the laws cause differences in the 
frequency or severity of violations. Importantly, future studies could also look at HIPAA 
violations and mobile technology, since many current uses of mobile technology used by 
doctors and nurses are breaches of HIPAA rules. Lastly, future studies might further explore 
the role of organizational attention on IT privacy rule violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The explosive growth of HIT in the healthcare industry and the number of HIPAA 
violations reported each year demonstrate a need for healthcare organizations to improve 
HIPAA-regulation compliance. Unless changes in regulatory environments and 
organizational structures change dramatically for the better, HIPAA violations are likely to 
worsen. Fortunately, SIPVHOM offers a way to explain and predict organizational violations 
of IT privacy rules, including HIPAA. The model and recommendations presented in this 
paper could help to improve regulatory environments and organizational structures by 
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APPENDIX A. POTENTIONAL OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF SIPVHOM CONSTRUCTS 
Table of Operationalizations for SIPVHOM Constructs  





Our business transactions with other 
units should be approved by upper 
management? 
Borrowed from (Tsai, 
2002). 
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly 
disagree – strongly agree). CEN-
2 
Any agreement or dispute over 
interunit activities should be reported 
to upper management and we should 
let them settle the issue? 
CEN-
3 
Upper management has the ultimate 
power to decide whether or not we 






On average, how many days per year 
do you spend in interdepartmental 
committees, teams, and task forces? 
Borrowed from (Ghoshal 
et al., 1994). 
NET-
2 
On average, how many days per year 
do you spend in interdepartmental 
meetings and conferences? 
NET-
3 
On average, how many days per year 








Compared to other healthcare 
organizations, my organization has: 
A great deal of knowledge about 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule here 
or ask about HIPAA in general] 
Borrowed from (Moorman 
& Miner, 1997). 
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly 
disagree – strongly agree). 
OML-
2 
Compared to other healthcare 
organizations, my organization has: 
A great deal of experience with [insert 
a particular HIPAA IT rule here or ask 
about HIPAA in general] 
OML-
3 
Compared to other healthcare 
organizations, my organization has: 
A great deal of familiarity with [insert 
a particular HIPAA IT rule here or ask 
about HIPAA in general] 
OML-
4 
Compared to other healthcare 
organizations, my organization has: 
Invested a great deal in measure to 
prevent [insert a particular HIPAA IT 







Rate the degree of consensus among 
administrators with regard to 
procedures for [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule]: 
Borrowed from (Moorman 
& Miner, 1997). 
Rated 1 to 7 (low – high). 
OMD-
2 
Rate the degree of consensus among 
doctors with regard to procedures for 
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[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule]: 
OMD-
3 
Rate the degree of consensus among 
nurses with regard to procedures for 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule]: 
 




It is routine for our organizations to be 
audited by Health and Human 
Services to identify HIPAA computer 
violations. 
Borrowed from (Qing et al., 
2011). Rated 1 to 7 




Organizations that [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule here] will be caught. 
CER-
3 
It is likely that [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule here] can be traced 





Organizations caught [insert a 
particular HIPAA IT rule here] will be 
severely punished. 
Borrowed from (Qing et al., 
2011). Rated 1 to 7 




Organizations caught [insert a 





Organizations caught [insert a 
particular HIPAA IT rule here] will 





For our organization, actions against 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule 
here] are immediate. 
Borrowed from (Qing et al., 
2011). Rated 1 to 7 
(strongly disagree – 
strongly agree). CEL-
2 
For our organization, actions against 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule 
here] are instantaneous. 
CEL-
3 
For our organization, actions against 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule 
here] are timely. 
Procedural 
emphasis 
Goal clarity GC-1 Procedural emphasis measures could 
be  
It is clear what outcomes are 
expected in the HIPAA rule that 
states [insert a particular HIPAA IT 
rule here]. 
Borrowed from (Tziner et 
al., 1993). Rated 1 to 7 





The information provided on the HHS 
website about [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule here] will help you 
protect patient’s medical information. 
GC-3 
 
The information provided on the HHS 
website about [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule here] was sufficiently 
unambiguous. 
GC-4 The information provided to you by 
HHS about [insert a particular HIPAA 
IT rule here] was sufficiently detailed. 





Rule density RD-1 As a researcher, select the HIPAA IT 
violation of interest and follow the 
instructions to the right. It should be 
the same rule that you select for the 
scenario above. 
Borrowed from (Sullivan, 
2010). 
Calculate the “density” of 
rules by tracking, coding, 
and aggregating the 
following statistics for a 
specific time period: 
• Gather all rule 
proposals and 
finalization dates 
• Code all rules into 
distinct categories 





• Record finalized 
rules as an event, 
non-finalized rules 
as a non-event 
• Code all rule 
violation reports 
(incident reports) 










What do you believe is the risk for 
your organization due to the 
possibility that: 
My organization could be issued 
severe sanctions for violations of 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule 
here] 
Borrowed from (Dinev & 
Hart, 2006).  
Rated 1 to 7 (very low risk 
– very high risk). 
Fill in with the rule 




The media could damage my 
organization’s image by sharing 
information about violations of [insert 
a particular HIPAA IT rule here] 




My organization will be caught if it 
violates [insert a particular HIPAA IT 
rule here] 
Likelihood of a 
rule violation 




If you were Sam, what is the 
likelihood that you would have [insert 
a particular HIPAA IT rule here]? 
 
 
Borrowed from (D'Arcy et 
al., 2009). 
Rated 1 to 7 (very unlikely 
– very likely) 
If multiple scenarios are 
used:  
MI-1 = MI-1(scenario1) + 
…MI-1(scenarion). 
MI-2 I could see myself [insert a particular 
HIPAA IT rule here] if I were in Sam’s 
situation. 





MC-1 It was morally acceptable for Sam to 
[insert a particular HIPAA IT rule 
here]. 
Fill in with the rule 
selected for the scenario. 
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